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Damage Caps: Recent Trends
in American Tort Law
Mark K. Osbeck
University of Michigan - Law School
Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States

Introduction
Damage caps and other limitations on damages have become increasingly important in American tort law during the past thirty years. This
trend shows no signs of abating; in fact, it has gained increasing
momentum since President Bush took office in 2001. This chapter
traces the evolution of damage caps and other limitations on damages
and provides a summary of recent developments in this area.

History of Damage Caps
The enactment of damage caps and other types of liability reform
over the past three decades represents one of the most significant legislative influences in the development of American tort law. 1 Traditionally, American tort law has been the domain of the courts, a
creation of the Common Law inherited from England. 2 While legislatures have from time to time enacted statutes that change certain limited
1

2

Elizabeth Urban Karzon, "Medical Malpractice Statutes: a Retrospective Analysis",
1984 Annual Survey ofAmerican Law (1984) at p. 693, note 5.
W. Page Keaton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton and Daniel G. Owen, Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts, W. Page Keeton (gen. ed.), 5th Ed. ( 1984) at p. 19 ("Tort
law is overwhelmingly Common Law, developed in case-by-case decision-making by
the courts."); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law ofTorts, atpp. 27-28 (2001) ("American tort law,
though now often supplemented by statutory law, initially developed through Common
Law decisions, and these decisions still constitute the main source to which judges tum
for guidance in deciding cases.").
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seek recovery of an additional amount from a special fund set up by
the state, generally called a patients' compensation fund, that was
funded at least in part by contributions from health care providers. 12
By the early 1980s, almost all of the states had enacted some sort
of legislation in response to the perceived medical malpractice crisis
of the 1970s, and approximately twenty states had enacted caps on one
or more categories of damages. 13 By this time, the medical malpractice
crisis appeared to have abated and so there was little demand for further legislative action during the first half of the decade.
Around 1985, however, a new crisis arose, and this time the
Republican-led proponents of damage caps in the various state legislatures began demanding a more far-reaching reform of the tort liability system. The focus of this second "crisis" was broader than just
medical malpractice insurance. This time, proponents of liability
reform (including physicians, insurers and corporate leaders) alleged
that a "litigation explosion" had created a crisis in a number of industries besides just the medical profession, making it very difficult and
expensive for these companies to obtain liability insurance and causing them to pass on cost increases to their customers. 14 This argument
has had remarkable longevity. At a White House economic summit in
December 2004, President Bush devoted an entire panel discussion to
the need to crack down on excessive lawsuits and damage awards. He
argued that frivolous lawsuits and the fear of being sued had chilled
the growth of small businesses and raised health care costs. "A judicial system run amok", he said, "is one that makes it really hard for
small businesses to stay in business" .15
The latter half of the 1980s saw state legislatures attempting to enact
wide-reaching liability reforms in an attempt to slow the alleged
increase in litigation costs that was purportedly driving up the cost of
liability insurance. 16 Many of these reforms were similar to the
Kevin J. Gfell, "The Constitutional and Economic Implications of a National Cap on
Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions" (2004) 37 Ind. L.Rev. 773,
at p. 797.
13 Elizabeth Urban Karzon, "Medical Malpractice Statutes: A Retrospective Analysis",
1984 Annual Survey ofAmerican Law (1984) 693, at p. 697.
14 Christopher T. Stidvent, "Tort Reform in Alaska: Much Ado About Nothing?", 16
Alaska L.Rev. (1999) 61, at pp. 65-67.
15 Bill Nichols, "Bush Hosts.Economic Forum", USA Today, 15 December 2004, atp. 2,
available at http://usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-12-15-economic-conf_ x.htm.
16 Ellen S. Pryor, "The Last Ten Years: What Your Students Know That You Should
Know Too" (1996) 46 J. Legal Educ. 609, at p. 622.

12
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reforms of the 1970s, but they applied not just to medical malpractice,
but to tort actions in general. 17
State legislatures during this time also began to scrutinize punitive
damage awards more carefully 18 and a number of states imposed caps
on the amount of punitive damages (also known as "exemplary damages") that plaintiffs could recover. The most common measures limited punitive damage awards to an amount equal to the compensatory
damages awarded, 19 to some single-digit multiplier of this amount or,
in some states, to a combination ofboth. 20 A few states have prohibited punitive damages altogether 21 or allow them only when they are
specifically allowed by a statute. 22
With regard to caps on non-economic damages, a number of states
enacted or modified such legislation in the 1980s, 23 imposing caps
that ranged from US $250,000 to US $875,000. 24 These statutes were
fairly diverse in other ways as well. Some states confined the caps
to medical malpractice actions, while others applied the caps
more broadly to all tort actions; likewise, some indexed the caps to
17

18

19

20

21

22
23

24

Nancy L. Manzer," 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on
Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability" (1988) 73 Cornell L. Rev.
628, at p. 633.
Ryan Fowler, "Comment, Why Punitive Damages Should be a Jury's Decision in
Kansas: A Historical Perspective" (2004) 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 631, at p. 655; Ellen S.
Pryor, "The Last Ten Years: What Your Students Know That You Should Know Too"
(1996) 46 J. Legal Educ. 609, at p. 626.
The Colorado legislature, for example, capped exemplary damages at an amount equal
to compensatory damages. Thus, exemplary damages are capped at US $ I 00,000 for a
plaintiff who receives US $100,000 in compensatory damages: C.R.S., Section
13-21-102(1)(a).
In New Jersey, for example, punitive damages are capped at five times the amount of
compensatory damages or US $350,000, whichever is greater: N.J. Stat. Ann., Section
2A: 15-5.14(b).
The Nebraska Supreme Court, for example, has held that "it is a fundamental rule oflaw
in this state that punitive, vindictive and exemplary damages are not allowed": Miller v.
Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 (Neb. 1975).
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., Section 507: 16.
Alabama, for example, enacted legislation in 1987 that imposed a US $400,000
combined cap for non-economic and punitive damages together (Alabama Code,
Section 6-5-544), but the Alabama Supreme Court later ruled that it was
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds: Moore v. Mobile Infirmity Ass 'n, 592 So.
2d 156(Ala.1991).
Nancy L. Manzer," 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on
Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability" (1988) 73 Cornell L. Rev.
628, at p. 637.
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inflation or created exceptions to the caps for very severe injuries,
while others maintained fixed limits. 25
The 1990s were a relatively quiet period for damage caps. State
legislative efforts did continue during this time, but at a slower pace.
Several states imposed new damage caps. The legislatures of both
Illinois 26 and Ohio, 27 for example, enacted caps on non-economic
damages in the mid-1990s, but the supreme courts of both states
found them to be unconstitutional before the decade was through. 28
Other states modified existing liability reform legislation. Michigan,
for example, which already had a cap on non-economic damages in
medical malpractice cases, passed a measure in 1993 that imposed a
two-tiered cap: 29 in most cases, non-economic damages were capped
at US $280,000 but, in certain severe cases, the cap was raised to
US $500,000. 30 By the end of the decade, a majority of the states had
at least one kind of damage cap in place. 31
At the federal level, the "Republican Revolution" re-configured
Congress in 1994, with Republicans making sweeping gains in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate and gaining a majority in
both for the first time in decades. This sweeping change ushered in
the first serious possibility of federal liability reform. While there
had been a number of earlier attempts in Congress to impose national
damage caps and other types of tort reform, 32 it was not until the
mid-term elections of 1994 that Republicans gained a substantial
enough advantage in Congress to have a realistic chance of passing
these types ofreforms over Democratic opposition. Thus, in 1996,

25 Nancy L. Manzer," 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on

26
27

28
29
30

31
32

Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability" (1988) 73 Cornell L. Rev.
628, at pp. 637-38.
735 ILCS 5/2-1115.1 imposed a US $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in
medical malpractice cases.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann., Section 2323.54 imposed a cap on non-economic damages
equal to the greater of US $250,000 or three times compensatory damages (with a
US $500,000 maximum) in most medical malpractice cases.
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d I 057 (Ill. 1997); State ex rel. Ohio A cad. of
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
M.C.L.A., Section 600.1483.
"The Two-Tiered Cap on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases: A
Legislative 'Solution' Creates Myriad Problems for the Courts" (1999) 78 Mich. B.J. 556.
Dan B. Dobbs, The Law o/Torts, (2001) at pp. 1071-72.
Eleanor D. "Kinney, Malpractice Reforms in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Future
Successes?" (1995) 20 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 99, at pp. 112-119.
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Congress enacted the Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act, 33
which would have implemented several tort reforms, including a
US $250,000 cap on punitive damages. President Clinton, however,
vetoed the legislation, citing federalism concerns over the idea of
nationwide liability reform measures.34
Probably the most significant development in the area of liability
reform in the 1990s was the involvement of the judiciary in setting
constitutional limitations on damages, specifically punitive dam
ages. In the past, courts had occasionally exercised their inherent
authority under the doctrine of remittitur to reduce jury awards of
damages that the courts found to be clearly excessive.35 However, in
the 1990s, the United States Supreme Court took matters a step fur
ther in the seminal case of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. 36
There, for the first time, the court definitively established that the
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution provided substan
tive limits on the size of punitive damage awards.37
Although, by the year 2000, a majority ofstates had enacted legislation
that imposed some sort of cap on compensatory damages,38 such liability
reform did not occur without significant resistance. Opponents of dam
age caps, led by lobbying groups like the American Trial Lawyers Asso
ciation,39 have led a determined effort to undermine reform initiatives
and have raised some persuasive criticisms against damage caps. Proba
bly the most compelling of these criticisms from a policy perspective is
the punitive effect that caps on non-economic damages have on the most
severely injured plaintiffs. In essence, caps on non-economic damages
fully compensate those who suffer comparatively less severe injuries,
and whose damages are, therefore, under the cap, but only partially com
pensate the most severely injured, whose damages exceed the cap. 40
HR 956, 104th Cong. (1996).
Allison H. Eid, "Symposium: Tort Liability, The Structural Constitution and the States"
(2001) 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 740, at p. 741.
35 William P. Gunnar, "Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising Medical Malpractice
Premiums?" (2004) 13 Annals Health Law 465, at pp. 485-86; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293
U.S. 474, at pp. 482-486 (1935) (discussing the long jurisprudential history of the
remittitur doctrine).
36 BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
37 BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at pp. 568 and 574-575.
38 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, (2001) at p. 1071.
39 American Trial Lawyers Association, "Medical Malpractice: Questions and Answers" at
http://www.atlaorg/consumennediaresources/tier3/press_room/FACfS/medmaVicqandaaspx.
40 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2001) at p. 1072.
33

34
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As a result of these types of concerns, damage cap statutes have
encountered formidable challenges in the state courts, 41 where opponents of damage caps have argued that the caps violate various state
constitutional guarantees, including equal protection, due process,
the separation of powers between the several branches of government
and the right to trial by jury. 42 However, notwithstanding the force of
these arguments, a majority of courts that have considered the constitutionality of damage-cap legislation under their state constitutions
have upheld the challenged legislation. 43

An Overview of Recent Trends Concerning Damage Caps
The new millennium did not quiet the call for tort reform in the United
States. On the contrary, during the last few years, particularly since
President Bush took office in 2001, tort reform efforts have taken on
renewed importance. Once again, the American Medical Association
and the insurance industry have raised the specter of a malpractice
insurance crisis44 and, once again, proponents ofliability reform are
41

42

43

44

Interestingly, the courts have played a somewhat conflicting role in the history of damage
caps. On the one hand, courts at the state level have created an impediment to damage-cap
legislation by striking down a number of statutes as unconstitutional. On the other
hand, since the Gore decision, courts (particularly the federal courts) have held that
court-imposed limitations on excessive punitive damages are not only constitutionally
permissible, but are constitutionally mandated by the 14th Amendment.
Kevin J. Gfell, "The Constitutional and Economic Implications of a National Cap on
Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions", 37 Ind. L. Rev. (2004) 773,
at pp. 783-800.
Kevin J. Gfell, "The Constitutional and Economic Implications of a National Cap on
Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions" (2004) 37 Ind. L. Rev. 773,
at pp. 810--814; Carol A. Crocca, "Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application
of State Statutory Provisions Limiting Amount of Recovery in Medical Malpractice
Claims" (1995) 26 A.L.R. 5th 245.
American Medical Association, "America's Medical Liability Crisis: A National
View" (July 2003) (discussing how the American Medical Association in 2003
designated nineteen states as suffering from a medical liability crisis and another
twenty-five states as showing "problem signs"), cited in "The Current Medical Liability
Insurance Crisis: An Overview of the Problem, Its Catalysts and Solutions" (2004) 13
Annals Health Law 505, at pp. 506-510 (discussing also the nationwide doctors' strike
in 2003 protesting against the malpractice insurance crisis); William R. Brody,
"Dispelling Malpractice Myths", reprinted from Washington Post, 14 November 2004,
available at http://www.jhu.edu/president/news/wpnov04.html (letter to editor from
president of Johns Hopkins University addressing new medical malpractice crisis).
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pushing for legislation to impose caps on damages and to enact other
types of reforms to remedy an alleged "liability crisis" within the
civil justice system. 45 As discussed below, liability reform initiatives, focusing in large part on damage caps and other limitations on
damages, are continuing to advance on several fronts, particularly at
the federal level.
State Legislation

At the state level, damage-cap legislation is still an important component of ongoing tort reform efforts. In the past several years, a number
of state legislatures have either enacted damage caps for the first
time, enacted revised damage caps after their state courts struck
down earlier caps as unconstitutional or enacted more stringent caps on
non-economic damages than had previously been in effect.
Mississippi and Arkansas are examples of states that have enacted
caps on damages fairly recently. In 2002, Mississippi's legislature
passed a cap on non-economic damages for the first time 46 imposing a
US $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice
cases and a US$ I-million cap on non-economic damages in all other
civil cases. In 2003, Arkansas' legislature enacted a cap on punitive
damages for the first time. 47 The statute limits punitive damages to
the greater of US $250,000 or three times compensatory damages, not
to exceed US $1-million, and it allows the court to exceed this amount
where the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant purposefully harmed the plaintiff. South Carolina's legislature passed its first cap on non-economic damages, imposing a
US $350,000 cap per claimant in medical malpractice cases, with an
exception to the cap for cases involving gross negligence, willful,
wanton or reckless behavior or fraud. 48
Florida and Ohio are examples of states that have recently enacted
new damage caps after earlier legislation had been found to be unconstitutional. In 2003, at the urging of Governor Bush, the Florida legislature enacted new caps on non-economic damages of US $500,000
for individual providers and US $750,000 for hospitals and other
45

46
47
48

"The Current Medical Liability Insurance Crisis: An Overview of the Problem, Its
Catalysts and Solutions" (2004) 13 Annals Health Law 505, at pp. 515-516.
Miss. Code Ann., Section I 1-1-60.
Ark. Code. Ann., Section 16-55-208.
S.C. Code Ann., Section 15-32-220.
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non-practitioner defendants, with an exception for cases involving
permanent vegetative state, death or other "catastrophic" injury. In
these cases, the non-economic damage caps are US $ !-million for
recoveries against individual providers and US $1.5-million for
recoveries against hospitals. 49
Similarly, the legislature in Ohio enacted new legislation in 2002
that imposed a cap on non-economic damages equal to the greater of
US $250,000 or three times compensatory damages, not to exceed
US $350,000 per plaintiff and US $500,000 for each occurrence. 50
There is an exception to this cap allowing non-economic damages of
up to US $500,000 per plaintiff and US $ !-million per occurrence in
cases involving certain major injuries.
Texas and West Virginia are examples of states that have imposed
more stringent damage caps in the past several years. 51 In 1977, the
Texas legislature imposed a US $500,000 cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions, with an adjustment based on inflation that caused the dollar amount of the cap to expand significantly
over the next twenty-five years to approximately US $1.3-million. 52 In
2003, the legislature reversed this upward trend, rolling back the
non-economic damages cap to US $250,000 collectively for all physicians, to US $250,000 for each individual health care institution
and to US $750,000 for all health care institutions. 53

49

50
51

52

53

Laws of Florida, Chapter 2003--416; Adam D. Glassman, "The Imposition ofFederal
Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in
Health Care (2004) 37 Akron L. Rev. 417, at pp. 437-38.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann., Section 2323.43.
A number of other states, by not adjusting caps for inflation, have effectively imposed
more stringent caps. California, for example, enacted a US $250,000 cap on
non-economic damages in 1975 and has not raised that amount since that time. After
adjusting for inflation, that amount in 2004 was worth approximately US $72,000 in
1975 dollars: Elizabeth Stewart Poisson, "Comment: Addressing the Impropriety of
Statutory Caps on Pain and Suffering Awards in the Medical Liability System", 82
N.C.L. L.Rev. (2004) 759, at p. 773.
Adam D. Glassman, "The Imposition ofFederal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability
Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care" (2004) 37 Akron L. Rev.
417,atp.455.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann., Sections 74.301-74.303; Adam D. Glassman, "The
Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Actions: Will They Cure
the Current Crisis in Health Care" (2004) 37 Akron L. Rev. 417, at pp. 454-55.
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The West Virginia legislature acted in a similar manner. In the
1980s, it enacted a US $I-million cap on non-economic damages in
medical malpractice cases. 54 In 2003, it lowered the cap to
US $250,000, regardless of the number of plaintiffs or defendants. 55
The legislature did create an exception, however, for cases involving
wrongful death or bodily impairment, where the cap is US $500,000.
Finally, some states have begun to expand limitations on damages
beyond the traditional realm of tort law. In Colorado, for example, the
legislature (which had been - until the Republicans recently lost
control of the legislature in the elections of November 2004-among
the most aggressive of the state legislatures in enacting tort
reforms) 56 in 2003 enacted a damage cap provision limited to construction defect cases. 57 This statute requires a property owner to
give a contractor notice and an opportunity to remedy the defect
before filing suit based on defective construction. It also limits damages recoverable by a property owner in most cases to the lesser of the
fair market value of the property minus the defect, the cost ofreplacing the property or the reasonable cost of repairing the defect. The
statute does, however, allow certain additional costs in the case of
residential property. The statute also allows recovery for medical
costs in personal injury cases, but it limits the amount recoverable for
non-economic damages to US $250,000. 58
The Colorado legislature also passed a measure in July 2004 that
prohibits the recovery of non-economic damages in contract actions. 59
This prohibition applies to all actions based on contract unless specifically exempted by the statute. The statutory exceptions include:
( 1) Where the contract specifically provides for non-economic damages;
(2) Where there is a willful and wanton breach of a first party insurance contract; and
(3) Where there is a bad faith breach of a third party insurance contract, which constitutes a separate tort.
Adam D. Glassman, "The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability
Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care" (2004) 37 Akron L. Rev.
417, atp. 457.
55 W.Va. Code, Section 55-7B-8.
56 John G. Salmon, "Fifteen Years of Colorado Legislative Tort Reform: Where Are We
Now?", 30 February 2001, Colo. Law. at p. 5.
57 C.R.S., Sections 13-20-801 et seq.
58 C.R.S., Section l3-20-806(4)(a).
59 C.R.S., Section 13-21-l02.5(6)(a).
54
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In the last instance, non-economic damages are still capped at
US $250,000 under the state's general cap on non-economic damages
in tort actions. 60
These latter two examples of legislation are significant in that they
seem to indicate a desire among proponents of tort reform to expand
the scope of damage caps beyond the realm of medical malpractice and
other types of tort actions and to impose specific limitations on the
types and amounts of damages that can be recovered in other actions,
such as breach of contract actions. How expansive this damage capping in contract law will become on a national level remains to be seen.

State Constitutional Amendments
The battle over damage caps opened on a new front over the past two
years, as several states considered amending their constitutions to
address damage caps. These proposed amendments arose as ballot initiatives, in which the issue of damage caps was put directly to the voters.
In 2003, Texas became the first state to pass a constitutional amendment
that specifically empowered its legislature to enact damage-cap legislation. 61 Texas voters, in a hotly contested ballot initiative, narrowly
approved Proposition 12, which amended the Texas constitution to
allow the legislature the authority to pass damage-cap legislation. This
amendment was designed to eliminate concern among proponents of
damage caps that the state courts would once again try to strike down
recently enacted damage-capping legislation as unconstitutional. In
1989, the Texas Supreme Court struck down an earlier damage-cap
statute as unconstitutional. 62 Proposition 12, which became Article III,
Section 66 of the Texas Constitution, was intended to ensure that this
did not happen again.
Recently, in the general election of November 2004, two other
states considered constitutional amendments that were similar to the
Texas amendment. In Oregon, voters defeated by less than one per
cent of the vote a constitutional measure to allow limitations on
C.R.S., Section 13-21-102.5(3)(a). This statute extends the cap on non-economic
damages to US $500,000 where the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
such an extension is justified.
61 Michael J. Cetra, "Comment, Damage Control: Statutory Caps on Medical Malpractice
Claims, State Constitutional Challenges and Texas's Proposition 12" (2004) 42 Duq. L.
Rev. 537, at pp. 551-55.
62 Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).

60
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non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions. 63 Similarly,
in Wyoming, where the state constitution had long prohibited the
enactment oflegislative damage caps, voters in November 2004 considered an initiative known as Amendment D that would have
amended the constitution to specifically allow the state legislature to
enact damage caps without fear of court challenges. This amendment
too failed by a very small margin of votes. 64
Finally, in Colorado, voters in November 2004 rejected proposed
Amendment 34, which would have eliminated the damage caps that
the Colorado legislature had earlier imposed in construction defect
cases. Specifically, Amendment 34 would have made it unconstitutional to limit a property owner's right to recover damages in actions
based on the failure to construct improvements to real property in a
"good and workmanlike manner". 65 It would not have applied to caps
on punitive damage awards. Voters rejected the initiative by an overwhelming margin, 66 apparently motivated by construction industry
advertising that fanned fears that the amendment could be used to
hold homeowners liable upon reselling for any repairs or modifications they had made.
Unless federal legislation that pre-empts state damage-cap legislation is enacted in the next few years (which is a definite possibility),
it is likely that more states will follow Texas's lead and put proposed
constitutional amendments authorizing damage caps directly to the
voters. If these initiatives are successful, proponents of damage caps
in these states will have effectively side-stepped judicial review of
damage caps, which has traditionally presented a significant obstacle
to such legislation.
Role of the Courts in Expanding Damages Limitations
Since the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 67 the courts have taken an active role
in limiting punitive damage awards, and subsequent decisions have
attempted to delineate the constitutional limits of these awards. In
63

64
65
66
67

State Measure Number 35, at Oregon Secretary of State, Elections Division, available
at www.sos.state.or.us/elections.
"Election 2004", USA Today, available at www.usatoday.com/newslpoliticselections/front.htm.
"State of Colorado, Analysis of the 2004 Ballot Proposals 27" (2004).
"Election 2004", USA Today, available at www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/front.htm.
BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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2003, the United States Supreme Court expanded on its due process
analysis in the seminal case of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell. 68

State Farm was an insurance bad faith case. The plaintiff, Campbell,
was involved in an automobile accident in which one driver was killed
and another badly injured. His insurer, State Farm, refused a US
$50,000 policy limit settlement offer and took the case to trial, even
though its own investigators determined that Campbell was wholly at
fault. The jury found that Campbell was wholly liable and returned a
verdict against him for approximately US $185,000. State Farm
refused to pay the excess judgment and also refused to post a bond for
Campbell's appeal, so Campbell filed a claim against State Farm for
bad faith, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
At trial, the jury awarded Campbell US $2.6-million in compensatory damages, largely for emotional distress, plus an additional
US $145-million in punitive damages. The trial court reduced the verdict to US $I-million in compensatory damages and US $25-million
in punitive damages, but the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the original punitive damage award. In doing so, it looked to the size of State
Farm's net worth and to evidence concerning State Farm's treatment
of other insureds across the nation. State Farm then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to determine
whether the punitive damages award was constitutional. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the Utah Supreme Court, finding that
the US $145-million punitive damage award was so excessive that it
violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. In so holding, the Court relied on, and further developed, the three" guideposts"
it had earlier set out in Gore.
First, the Court reiterated that the size of the punitive damage
award must correspond to the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. That principal, the Court emphasized, is the most important factor to consider in assessing the constitutionality of a punitive damage
award and, in making that determination, the reviewing court must
evaluate only conduct of the defendant that was directed toward the
plaintiff. Thus, a "defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the
acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as a basis for
punitive damages" .69 The Utah Supreme Court erred because it
68
69

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) at p. 422.
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looked to the nationwide business practices of State Farm in assessing
its degree of reprehensibility, rather than just its conduct directed
toward the plaintiff. "A defendant should be punished for conduct
that harmed the plaintifr', the Court held, "not for being an unsavory
individual or business" .70
With regard to the second guidepost, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Gore that the size of a punitive damages award must track the
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff. It then went on to
clarify this rule, holding that "few awards exceeding a single-digit
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process". 71 Because the award of punitive
damages in State Farm was 145 times the award of compensatory
damages, the Court held that it was constitutionally suspect.
Finally, the Court reiterated that the size of the punitive damages
award must take into account the magnitude of the civil and criminal
penalties for which the defendant could be held liable because of its
improper conduct. If these are disproportionate, then the punitive damage award is not likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Under
Utah law, the most that State Farm could have been liable for because
of its fraud was a US $10,000 fine, which was a tiny fraction of the
US $145-million punitive damages award. Thus, the Court held, under
all three guideposts, that the punitive damages award in State Farm
was constitutionally infirm. Accordingly, the Court vacated the decision of the Utah Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate amount of punitive damages.
Since the State Farm decision, the United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly referred to this holding in remanding several later
appeals for reconsideration of their punitive damages awards. 72
Additionally, a number of lower court decisions, both state and federal, have attempted to refine the analysis further. 73 Also, while these
due process constraints on punitive damages are not strictly speaking
"damage caps", since they do not impose strict limits on the amount of
punitive damages courts may award, they do serve much the same
10
71
72
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) at p. 423.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) at p. 425.
Ford Motor Co. v. Romo, 538 U.S. 1028 (2003); Cass v. Stephens, 538 U.S. 1054
(2003).
For example, Willow Inn v. Public Service Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 W.L. 21152949 (3d. Cir.
2003); /gen Inter. Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH, 335 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2003);
Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2003).
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purpose. Furthermore, because these court-imposed damage limitations
constitute constitutional precedents, their importance is magnified
for, unlike legislatively imposed damage caps, they cannot easily be
reversed with the next shift in political climate.

Congressional Initiatives
It is likely that federal legislation will be the most significant driver
of liability reform over the next few years. During President Bush's
first term, Republicans in Congress introduced legislation that was
popularly known as the HEALTH Act, which stood for the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Health Care Act, of2003 .74 This
Act sought, among other things, to:
(1) Cap non-economic damages at US $250,000 in "health care
lawsuits", including not only medical malpractice, but also
actions against manufacturers and sellers of drugs and medical
devices;
(2) Cap punitive damage awards in such cases at US $250,000 or
twice the amount of compensatory damages, whichever was
greater;
(3) Allow evidence of collateral source payments;
(4) Establish a relatively short statutory limitations period;
(5) Eliminate joint liability on the part of defendants; and
(6) Restrict the amount of attorneys' fees that plaintiffs' lawyers
could recover in contingency fee cases. 75
Significantly, the HEALTH Act by its terms pre-empted any state
laws that conflicted with it, except in certain cases in which the state
statute was even more restrictive of plaintiffs' rights. 76
The HEALTH Act was passed in the House of Representatives in
March 2003. However, a similar bill, S.11, failed without a vote in the
74
75
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This legislation was first introduced in the House of Representatives as HR 5, 108th
Cong. (2003) and is available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
Adam D. Glassman, "The Imposition ofFederal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability
Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?" (2004) 37 Akron L. Rev.
417, atpp. 421-28.
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Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?" (2004) 37 Akron L. Rev.
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Senate in July 2003, where it was derailed by a Democratic filibuster.
The Republicans' subsequent attempt to break the filibuster failed by
eleven votes. 77
It is unlikely that we have seen the last of Congressional attempts
to enact caps on non-economic and other damages. 78 President Bush
has made liability reform - including damage caps - a centerpiece
of his domestic agenda for his second term, calling for such reform in
his State of the Union Addresses in both 2003 and 2004 and in a number of subsequent addresses. In his 2003 State of the Union address,
for example, he stated:
"To improve our health care system, we must address one of
the prime causes of higher costs, the constant threat that
physicians and hospitals will be unfairly sued. Because of
excessive litigation, everybody pays more for health care,
and many parts of America are losing fine doctors. No one
has ever been healed by a frivolous lawsuit. I urge Congress
to pass medical liability reform. " 79
Thus, in President Bush's second term, it is likely that Republicans
in Congress will renew their efforts to pass liability reform, 80 particularly since they gained additional seats in the most recent election
in November 2004. Indeed, even some Democrats have joined in the
call for tort reform, or at least they have warmed to the idea. In his
second debate with the President, for example, Senator Kerry
agreed that there was a need for further tort reform, although he
down-played the importance of the problem with respect to the
larger issue ofrising health care costs. 81
Adam D. Glassman, "The Imposition ofFederal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability
Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?" (2004) 37 Akron L. Rev.
417,atpp.427-28.
78 In fact, Republicans re-introduced the HEAL TH Act, with its US $250,000 cap on
non-economic damages, in both the House of Representatives (H.R. 534) and the
Senate (S. 354) in February 2005.
79 President of the United States, George W. Bush, State ofthe Union Address, 28 January 2003,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
80 At his recent White House economic conference, held on I 4-15 December 2004,
President Bush stated: "I intend to take a legislative package to Congress which says we
expect the House and Senate to pass meaningful liability reform on asbestos, on class
action and medical liability": Susan Cornwell, "Bush Wants New Congress to Limit
Lawsuits", Yahoo News (Reuters) 15 December 2004, at p. I.
77
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Thus, at least at the national level, the debate seems to have largely
shifted from a discussion about the desirability ofliability reforms to
a discussion about the proper scope and structure of such reforms. In
light of this shift, it is doubtful that Democrats can continue to prevent the enactment of federal damage-cap legislation during
President Bush's second term. Federal caps on punitive and
non-economic damages that would apply nationwide are, therefore, a
very real possibility over the next few years.

Conclusion
Damage caps and other types of liability reform are likely to assume
increasing prominence in American tort law over the next several
years. While most such reform has occurred at the state level during
the past three decades - and is, therefore, somewhat piecemeal from
a national perspective-the Republicans' current control of Congress
and the Bush administration's strong support for liability reform portend an increasing federal involvement in this area oflaw in President
Bush's second term. Any such federal legislation would likely
include nationwide caps on punitive and/or non-economic damages,
at least in certain cases such as medical malpractice cases, and for that
reason alone it would constitute a significant milestone in the history
of American tort law.

&1

In response to an audience question as to why he chose a running mate who made a
living suing medical professionals, Senator Kerry emphasized that "John Edwards and
I support tort reform": "Debate Transcript, The Second Bush-Kerry Presidential
Debate", Commission on Presidential Debates, 8 October 2004, available at
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.htrnl.

